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The New Wage System and Industrial Relations in the 1990s

Sir Richard Kirby, Justice H ope, Professor M cKinnon, distinguished guests, ladies and
gentlemen. Let me begin by saying that it is good to be back at University. I look forward to
the opportunity given to me to present the Sir Richard Kirby lecture. My topic for tonight is
"the new wage system and industrial relations in the 1990s". I think the important thing we can
do in the midst of the worst recession in 60 years, with now double digit unemployment and
the prospect of unemployment staying high for a lot longer than people would have expected the single most im portant thing to do, is to reform our industrial relations and wage
determination system, both as an essential element of re-building the Australian economy and as
a fundamentally important element of re-building job opportunities in Australia.

The Chairman and Di Kelly mentioned a list of very distinguished speakers who have given this
address in the past. If I might be permitted some light hearted comment at the beginning, I feel
a bit out of place, given the run of names and personalities that have spoken here. Sir Richard
Kirby himself was the doyen of the centralised wage determination system and of the industrial
relations club. M r Justice Staples, well, pretty much an outcast to the IR club these days.
Bryan Noakes, a proprietor o f the IR club and the centralised system. Blanche d'Alpuget,
chronicler of the IR club, Simon Crean and Bill Kelty, they would have to be shop stewards for
the IR club and centralised system. Bert Evans, of course a pillar of the industrial relations club
and the centralised system and Brian McCarthy, well, what can you say - hijacker of the IR
club to say the least.

I would be happy to be described by next year's speaker as the odd person out, one who was in
fact a very significant sceptic of the centralised wage determination process in Australia and of
the role of the industrial relations club.

I should in fairness though, begin by acknowledging the tremendous contribution that Sir
Richard Kirby has made to industrial relations over many years. He has been both a notable
and a noble figure on the industrial relations landscape in Australia. For seventeen years he
presided over the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission, until he retired
from that post, as I suppose most o f you know, in 1973.

Those were the years which people would say were the golden years o f the centralised
industrial relations system which was set up at the turn of the century. They were in fact pretty
much the golden years that Sir Richard Kirby had the honour of overseeing. At the time there
was a formality and a degree of predictability about the wage determination process. The
national wage case would roll around regularly; the unions, the employers and the Government
would engage in the ritual of the courtroom and then Australian workers would wait and see
what benefits would be handed down to them from on high.

Wage case day became pretty much a national institution, a bit like the Melbourne Cup, or
perhaps I would be better to say a bit like Christmas, as a better analogy. But all that is
changing and my theme tonight is 'so it should, and so it must'.

In my view, in very simple terms, there should be no more national wage cases in Australia.
All future wage increases should be determ ined at the workplace level and linked to
performance or productivity.

I am getting a bit of a reputation these days for attacking sacred cows and I see a few signs in
the audience drawing my attention to that fact. Well, Sir Richard Kirby was quoted in The Age
last year as saying that the industrial relations system might be a sacred cow, but it is the only
cow we have. I would suggest that it is time that we tried a different animal. I know Sir
Richard was a great champion o f the centralised wage fixing system and remains a great
champion o f that system. At the time of the last election, he was again quoted in the Age as
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saying that the Accord was essential to industrial relations, that the C oalition’s policy of
enterprise bargaining wouldn't work and in fact, that it risked industrial confrontation.

Well, with great respect to Sir Richard, I disagree with him. I submit that the reality of the
industrial market place in recent months is that the break down o f the old order is now
inevitable. Now, I am, as many people in this audience may point out, a conservative. I don't
believe in tearing things down just for the sake of making change. If something is working
well, I generally take the view that it ought to be left alone. But I think the centralised wage
determination process isn't working well. I don't in any sense see the centralised system and
the Accord as a solution to our economic problems. Indeed, I see the centralised system and
the Accord processes as a fundamental part of our economic problems.

Back in the golden age o f the Australian economy, in the 50's and 60's and even the 70's, the
Conciliation and Arbitration Commission seemed to work pretty well and the process around it
seemed to work pretty well. But times have overtaken it. As the competitiveness o f Australia
has been eroded, as our living standards have slipped steadily lower, the role of the centralised
wage fixing process has come under increasing scrutiny and under increasing challenge.

Now, we are seeing a viable alternative emerge and passing rapidly from the processes of
theory to, what I believe, will be a reality. The clear trend now is away from the centralised
system of wage determination towards agreements at the enterprise level and both major
political parties are at least using the same words in that respect, although as I will point out,
there are quite fundamental differences between ourselves and the Government and the union
movement in terms of the way that system would work.

It is a trend that the Coalition Parties have been pushing for since the early to mid 1980's. We
have had a detailed policy on enterprise bargaining since the middle 1980's and it is a trend now
that is being reflected by shifts in rank and file attitudes and is enjoying a wider support in the
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general community. The task before policy makers today is to perceive the significance of this
trend. Smart policy makers will facilitate the trend and ensure that it works in the best interest
of dealing with our economic problems. That will mean overturning many of the principles and
customs that have developed in the Australian system of industrial relations over the past 90
odd years. It is going to require a basic change in attitudes and a substantial shift in practice.

I want to focus tonight on the bottom line o f our current circum stances - the level of
unemployment. I made the comment at the start that I feared unemployment would stay higher,
longer than most people have been prepared to admit, under the sort of policies we have seen in
recent years. W e know that the unemployment rate as measured by the Australian Bureau of
Statistics, is presently about 10.2 per cent. We are approaching one million unemployed, on
the basis o f the Government’s own numbers, in the course o f this financial year. One in ten
Australians across the board is unemployed, with the worst feature o f the unemployment
situation being the fact that there are now one in three youths unemployed in Australia.

But you can add to that official unemployment rate of 10.2 per cent the fact that there are a lot of
part time people who would prefer to work more, or full time people who are forced to work
less than 35 hours a week for some economic reason; either they have been pushed to a fewer
number of shifts or a fewer number of days. They may have been stood down for part of the
time, they may have been forced to work short time or whatever, and there are about another
600,000 of them, another 7.3 per cent of the workforce or thereabouts. So, you are looking at
17.5 per cent of the workforce who are either unemployed on the official definition or working
less than they want to. Then, when you recognise that there are a number of others who don't
get counted in that system because they have gone onto other benefits, you are nearly down to
one in five Australians who are facing the prospect of unemployment or having to live with the
situation where they work less than they would want to work.
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Among those numbers about 700,000 people all up are receiving unem ploym ent benefits.
About 16,000 of them are in W ollongong, with a measured unemployment rate of 11.3 per
cent. But most disturbing is the fact that there could be 300,000 or more of those people who
are long term unemployed, that is, unemployed for more than a 12 month period. The most
disturbing statistic of them all, is that there are some 160,000 families with the principal bread
winner unemployed at the present time. And as if that situation isn't bad enough, the forecasts
are worse. The Government's own numbers in the Budget said that unemployment would peak
at 10.75 per cent towards the end of this calendar year and would be on a downward trend by
the middle of next calendar year or the end of this financial year. The leaked document that
appeared this week showed that a government department is advising that the number will peak
at 11 per cent around the middle of next year and that it will still be above 10 per cent in the
middle of 1993 - just after the scheduled date for the next election.

We have taken the M urphy model, which is the Government's own model, and used the
Government's own numbers, which are quite optimistic numbers, and we have done some
extrapolation beyond 1993. You see on that model, whose time period runs out about 1995-96,
that measured unemployment is still about 9 per cent in the middle of this decade under existing
policies. That is achieved with a further fall in real wages, in that model, and it sees the current
account deficit jump back up to six per cent of GDP. Indeed, if you take the number further, to
get the unemployment number down under existing policies, you look for a much more
substantial fall in real wages in the course of this decade, but you still won't get anywhere near
full employment, as some economists would define at somewhere around 6 or 6.5 per cent, by
the end of the decade. Indeed, to achieve that level and depending on what assumptions you
want to make about population and the participation rate, we need to create somewhere between
1.4 and 1.9 million jobs. If the participation rate doesn't increase - and there has been, as you
know, a significant increase in recent years - then of course you are looking at a 1.4 million
task. If it does increase in line with recent trends, you are looking at more like 1.9 million jobs.
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Now, that is the reality of the 1990s. That is the reality that anyone in Government or anyone
in the union movement, or anyone in business is going to have to face. And it is not just the
hard unemployment number, it is all the social and financial pressures that spin off that, when
you see such high levels of youth unemployment.

The prospect that children leaving school now may not see a job for five years, the prospect that
crime and youth homelessness and so on, will increase the prospect of family pressure, family
break down and so on. So, it is a very daunting task for any Government and it is against that
background that I think we should put aside all sacred cows and ask some basic questions
about the nature of our wage determination process and the fundamental role it plays in relation
to creating jobs, or not creating jobs.

Now, to me, the Government doesn't understand the nature o f this situation. How could it,
when it is pushing ahead with a further general wage increase this year, in the midst of the
w orst recession in 60 years? It is pushing ahead with its proposal for occupational
superannuation, which on the basis of the Murphy model by the middle of the 1990's will cost
another 100,000 jobs. And it is pushing ahead with an attempt to preserve the centralised
system and the Accord even when, as I said before, they are a part of the problem, certainly not
part of the solution.

Indeed, I see the A ccord process as a fundam ental reason why

unemployment has got to the level it has and it is a fundamental element, of course, in our lack
of competitiveness.

For the rest of my remarks, I thought I would like to look at three things. I would like to look
at why I think the Accord is a problem; secondly, I would like to say something about the
current wage situation which is very delicate and thirdly, I would like to present an alternative.

There are several major problems with the Accord process. The first one, from an economic
point o f view, is that over the life o f the Hawke/Keating/Kerin Government, the Accord has
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given us uncompetitive wage outcomes. It has consistently failed to deal with the basic
problem of how to tackle unem ploym ent and inflation sim ultaneously.

Since 1983, for

example, nominal wages have increased at an average rate of about 6.5 per cent. To be fair to
the Accord process, if you go back to the early 1980's, people were expecting that you would
see larger nominal wage increases than 6 or 7 per cent. So in that sense, the Accord has held
wage increases down below the levels that were expected. But 6.5 per cent compares with a
rate of about 4 per cent in the seven major OECD countries - for nominal wage growth over the
same period - 6.5 in Australia, 4 per cent in the seven major OECD countries.

Not only have we outstripped the OECD wage average, but our labour productivity growth has
fallen short o f the overseas performance, running about half the rate o f the OECD countries.
We have lost competitiveness - because our employers have faced a faster growth in nominal
unit labour costs - than have their trading partners. Indeed, from 1983 to 1991 nominal unit
labour costs in Australia rose by an annual rate of about six per cent, which compares to annual
growth of unit labour cost of about three per cent in those major OECD countries.

The faster growth in nominal unit labour costs was for a time offset in Australia by the fact that
our exchange rate fell in 1985-86, but since then the pressures of the high exchange rate and
faster growing labour costs have seen our competitiveness recede - quite sharply - and it stands,
on the basis o f Treasury figures, 15 per cent below the 1983-84 levels.

So, the first

consequence was that we gave ourselves uncom petitive wage incom es and priced our
employers out o f international markets. At a time when we were trying to boost our trading
performance. The second consequence of the wage outcome process is that it underwrote an
inflation rate which for that period ran at roughly double that of our competitors. So, we had
double the wage increases on average, measured as unit labour cost, and double the rate of
inflation of our trading partners.
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The second reason why I think the Accord process has failed relates to the fact that it has also
failed those it was supposed to help, who are the workers in Australia. Unit labour costs, in
real terms, have fallen by over 8 per cent since 1982-83. So the worker has taken a cut in real
wages, yet our nominal unit labour cost have been uncompetitive by world standards. So a lot
of pain has been borne by workers for no gain in terms of competitiveness. Now, the workers
have been told, and the Prime M inister tells me almost every day in the Parliament, that you
shouldn't worry or shouldn't focus on unit labour costs p er se because there is this thing called
the social wage which has made workers a lot better off. They have been able to get family
assistance, better education, better health and now the prospect of improved superannuation.
But when you go in to those elements o f the social wage and you look at the distributional
effects of those elements of the social wage, workers haven't necessarily gained and in general
terms, quite often the average Australian family has gone significantly backwards, as recent
studies have shown.

In education, for example, the benefits have been concentrated on the higher income groups. In
health we see that the system is under real pressure, the queues are lengthening in hospitals, the
list of approved services is shrinking and so on. The trade-off has notionally been social wage
for nominal wage increases, but in general the average worker has gone backwards. To the
extent that those social wage benefits have been funded by tax rates higher than they otherwise
would have been, then of course there is no net gain at all, and in some cases they have gone
decidedly backwards.

The third reason why I think the Accord has failed, is that it has imparted an expansionary bias
to economic policy overall. And if you go back and read the original Accord document in
1982, which was the basis of the 1983 election campaign, you will see that it was argued that
the Accord would control inflation and therefore the G overnm ent could pursue more
stimulatory fiscal and monetary policies in order to sustain growth and create jobs. For part of
the period, there was a lot of job creation - 1 think the Government claims to have created 1.5
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million jobs in its first five years in office - but they were riot real sustainable jobs and they
were only achieved at the cost of a significant increase in international debt, indeed, at the price
of $70,000 in debt per job, over that period.
So an expansionary bias was imparted. Monetary policy, for example, saw credit growth o f 20
to 25 per cent right through from 1983 to about m id-1989. That underwrote a lot o f the boom
psychology of 1984 and it did again in 1987, 1988 and into early 1989.

The fourth failure of the Accord is that it has elevated Bill Kelty and Martin Ferguson, and
Simon Crean before them, to almost defacto Cabinet status. This has meant that they have had
an unusual influence over the structure and direction of Government policy and they have
actually blocked a lot of reform that is in fact essential to creating jobs in Australia. It is one of
the great ironies of the Accord that they have actually prevented the job creation they had been
out to achieve by establishing that particular link with Government.

And when you put the last two factors together, the fact that there is an expansionary bias to
macro policy generally and the fact that Bill Kelty and others were blocking major reforms in
other areas, it left the Government really only one policy instrument to deal with economic
crises as they emerged. That was monetary policy and high interest rates. They used it in
1985, in response to the exchange rate crisis through 85-86, and almost tipped the economy
into recession.

And of course, they used it again most recently from early '88 onwards to

pitch us in to the worst recession since the 1930's.

So, you have two things as a result o f those last two factors.

You had this boom, bust

sequence of economic events. The boom o f '83, '84, the bust of '85, '86, the boom of '87,
'88, '89 and the bust of '91, '92 and maybe beyond. And secondly, the heavy reliance on high
interest rates has left us with a very high level o f real interest rates, which has sustained our
exchange rate above its long term competitive level and therefore further sacrificed jobs. So,
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for the reasons that I have given you, I believe the Accord has been fundamental to creating the
circumstances we have today and accentuating the unemployment problem.

Now of course, recession is driving inflation lower in present circumstances but it is only doing
so by an unsustainable collapse in business profits and spending which is a legacy of the
1980’s and which was built up under the Accord. It has kept inflationary expectations higher
than they would otherwise have been right through that period. The rigidity o f inflation
expectation is reinforced by the Hawke Government's continued adherence to wage targets that
have been set for it by the ACTU. Although the Government says it is keen to move in current
circumstances to a decentralised process o f wage determ ination, which they describe as
enterprise bargaining, Mr Hawke and Senator Cook and Mr Kerin continue to talk about a wage
target for 1991-92 of 4.5 per cent. Such a target, as was admitted by M r Kerin, will imply a
wage growth through this financial year of 6.5 per cent, which is well in excess of the assumed
productivity in the Budget papers o f 3 per cent and guaranteed to re-ignite inflationary
concerns.

Now, the stupidity o f the current arrangements is that the ACTU is trying to run with a wage
rise that is akin to the wage rise that was granted right throughout the 1980s, but it is trying to
still run with the 6.5 per cent in what are entirely different circumstances. And aside from the
unacceptable unemployment situation, we have seen the drop in inflation around half that of the
average of the 1980's. We have seen no noticeable sign of improvement in productivity and we
have had a deteriorating external situation which has seen our terms of trade drop almost five
per cent since the beginning of this year. So it is, as I say, a stupid policy to pursue a wage rise
of that order of magnitude in the circumstances that I just described.

The problems that the Accord are causing us are being highlighted in the current recession. The
process of setting wage targets in advance and by decree from Canberra, without regard to
economic circumstances, has led to a massive growth in real wages, just as Mr Keating's
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disastrous miscalculations on monetary policy have sent our business sector into a tail spin.
You should stop and think about the increase in real wages that has taken place in recent days.
If you take the period from late 1989 to September 1992, that is if you include the
Government's own forecast of what will happen to wages this year and take into account that
the Government's new superannuation levy on employment will be introduced in that time
frame, then real wages between late '89 and September '92 will have risen by seven to eight per
cent. Seven to eight per cent in the midst of the worst recession in 60 years! Such a rise in real
wages in the middle of that recession is nothing short of sheer lunacy and it has contributed
perhaps as much as three percentage points of our current level of unemployment. The recent
leaked documents basically confirm those numbers. Unemployment is likely to go much higher
and remain close to ten per cent as we go into 1993.

As we look out into the 1990’s, we have to be prepared, I believe, to jettison the Accord,
jettison national wage cases, and jettison the centralised process of wage determination if we are
to have any hope of significantly improving our international competitiveness. And the
numbers are really alarming. .If we want to stabilise debt by the middle 1990's, that is not see it
grow faster than GDP, then we have to shift three and three quarter per cent of our economic
activity into exports throughout that period. And the alarming thing is when you go back over
the whole post war period, we have never shifted three and three quarter per cent of our
economic activity into exports in any one of those years. And that gives you, I believe, some
idea of the magnitude of the task that is before us in policy adjustment terms.

If we fail to adjust we are definitely on a slow train to mediocrity and we will be the backwater
of the Asia/Pacific region, which is the fastest growing region of the world and will be for the
next 40 or 50 years.

If we cannot lift our productivity performance above that of recent years, the only option will be
the one the Government has pursued; that is further cuts in real wages which have been
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decidedly against the best interest o f those they are supposed to be trying to help, namely
workers. Those real wage falls will flow through into falling living standards, increasing social
tensions and give us a less than adequate capacity to care for the sick, care for the aged, defend
our shores and to protect our environment and so on.

That is the sort of choice before this nation at the present time.

In simple terms, there are two quick conclusions from that assessment of the current wage
situation and outlook:

*

There should be no further national wage cases.

•

Further wage increases ought to be based on im provem ents in productivity and
performance.

I challenge the Prime Minister to formally forgo his current wage target of five per cent in 199192 or six and half per cent through the year.

Now, against that background, I put it to you that we have to think of an alternative approach to
wage determ ination which will actually address the fundam ental problem of lack of
competitiveness, while giving workers the opportunity to earn more and, if backed up with the
right tax package and other changes to the system, the opportunity to keep more of what they
earn. They are the principal motivations behind our policy of enterprise bargaining, which was
developed in the middle 1980's and is now in the process of being refined. Indeed, it is being
put into the form of draft legislation so that it will be ready to be introduced into the Parliament
in our early days in Government.
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Our policy is built on four key principles and this is where the differences start to emerge
between what I mean by enterprise bargaining or enterprise agreements and what the Prime
Minister and the ACTU and others mean by enterprise agreements.

First, the absolute right o f individual employers and their em ployees to make voluntary
agreements at a workplace level, w ithout the intervention o f industrial courts beyond the
protection, of course, of minimal hourly wages and safeguards that relate to health and safety.
This will permit wages and conditions to be set at a level that conforms with the capacity of the
enterprise to pay and also to encourage increased productivity and m ore sensible and
sustainable work practices, which will result in greater returns for the company as well as
greater rewards for the workers and perhaps also lower prices to the consumer. That is a very
important principle.

The centralised system has built us a great degree of uniformity. The single most important
thing to do in present circumstances is to re-establish some flexibility, or lack of uniformity, in
that system. What we have seen in recent years is that irrespective of the capacity of individual
firms or individual industries, there has been an across the board wage increase. It is ludicrous
to imagine that a 6.5% wage increase handed down by decree, perhaps as a result of some deal
done in the Lodge in the run up to the last Budget or whatever, should be equally applicable in
Broome or Geelong or Sydney or Melbourne or Townsville or whatever, irrespective o f the
firm, irrespective of the industry, irrespective of the circumstances in which they are operating.
That degree of uniformity, that lack of flexibility is one o f the fundamental problems in
Australia. The labour market simply doesn't work.

There aren't correct price signals; there

aren't differences between individuals in the same company because of differences in the
quality of their work; there aren't differences between companies in the same industry because
of differences in the perform ance of those companies; there aren't differences between
industries, some declining and some growing. It is of fundamental importance to get a re
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focussing of the negotiations back to the enterprise level, to the workplace level and voluntary
agreements are an essential element of that. So that is the first principle.

The second one is the absolute right of individual workers to join a union or not to join a union
if they wish to do so or if they don't wish to do so. This means, in simple terms, the end of
compulsory unionism and the end o f the closed shop. That is a fundamental right that will
again be protected in legislation.

The third policy principle is the upholding of the principle that all Australians, including
unionists, should be subject to the same laws of the land. And what we mean by that, in simple
terms, is that employees and employers would operate on an equivalent common law footing.
So there would be direct right o f legal access by an employee against an employer for wrongful
treatment, dismissal or whatever, and vice versa for an employer against an employee. That
common legal footing is fundamental to an effective workplace negotiation taking place.

And finally the right o f trade, unionists to associate or get together on the basis of their
enterprise, industry or craft without any arbitrary restrictions o f any kind. W hat I am looking
for in this fourth principle is really the opportunity for there to be enterprise based unions,
based on choice, based on a vote by the workers.

The key thing about those last three points is that we are not anti-union. We are not anti-union.
We are anti Bill Kelty being a defacto member of Cabinet. Sure, we are anti unions being a
branch of Government, sure - but I am not anti-union in the sense that they should do what
they were formed to do which is to represent the interests of workers at the workplace level.

In effect, what we are offering employers and their employees is the opportunity to opt out of
the centralised system and reach their own measured agreement on pay and conditions within
the circumstances of their own workplace. We are certainly not going to force this to happen.
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We don't believe in coercion or compulsion; we believe in creating the circum stances for
individual choice and in the legislative framework that I have described, those circumstances
will exist.

If employers are worried that they will be picked off by a powerful union, then they don't need
to leave the centralised system and vice versa. It is a question o f choice and we are giving
people that choice and establishing the direction under which they will find it worthwhile to go.
It certainly will not be based on compulsion or coercion in any sense. If workers and managers
want to stay in the centralised system they have that choice and they are able to do so. Indeed,
you are already seeing some Section 115 agreements being done within the centralised system,
which in effect starts the process towards enterprise based bargaining through staying within
the centralised system rather than opting out of the system.

I personally don't believe in compulsion and I don't think it is necessary because I believe that
the circumstances already exist in the minds and the attitudes of the rank and file all over
Australia for some of these changes to occur. In the midst of the worst recession in 60 years
you would expect them to; you would certainly hope that those pressures would be there. Let
me just give you a couple of specific examples of the shift in attitude that has taken place in
recent days. Let me talk to you about the example o f the Shepparton Preserving Company, a
company making canned fruits that was in very difficult circumstances. They were facing the
realistic prospect of closing down; they fired the board and then restructured the board, they
restructured the management, they cut overheads and the workers then said they, on their own
initiative, wanted to offer a cut in wages or some of their conditions of em ploym ent for a
limited period in order to keep their jobs and see if they could revitalise the company.

I speak with some authority on this because I went to Shepparton twice. I went just after they
announced the decision in order to talk to the workers to hear what they in fact had in mind. At
this time they were being heavied, to put it mildly, by John Halfpenny and some o f the other
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industrial thugs of the Victorian Left. The second time I went was some months after they'd
had reached that agreement to see how it worked in practice. You will recall that although they
didn't get exactly what they wanted, as they were forced to take an amendment to their award,
they, in effect, achieved the end they wanted, which was to offer a cut in their terms and
conditions of employment in order to keep their jobs. They offered, for example, to remove
over award payments to seasonals, to do Saturday or Sunday work on single time, to remove
staff leave loadings on a one-off basis of 17.5% and, as part of the deal, they also negotiated an
expanded profit share. Now the interesting thing that happened as a result o f that deal was all
the workers gained. They are better off and they will tell you they are better off. Secondly,
there was about a 48%, I was told, increase in productivity in that canning season relative to the
past. You can make light of what I say, but you think about standing on a production line
doing 2 million cans of canned fruit a day, thousands of cans flashing by and you are stuffing
them full of peaches, and think about how you get a 48% increase in productivity. One of the
workers said to me when I complimented him on the 48% increase in productivity, "you ain't
seen nothing yet, we have got a long way to go".

That one change in attitude, that offer o f a cut in terms and conditions, actually created a
situation where the workers gained, the company gained, the company survived and our
national exports improved. It was fundamental to what has got to be done in this country. The
worker attitude is there and it is working to the betterment of those workers as well as to the
betterment of the country.

Another example, which might be closer to the hearts of many people in this room, relates to
the brewing industry. I'll talk to you a little bit about Power Brewing where they actually have
done an enterprise agreement. They have put in a flat management structure with all their
employees multi-skilled. They work a 4 day, 40 hour week rather than a 35 week as at XXXX
for comparison. The average Power brewery worker earns $9,231 per annum more than does
the XXXX worker, $9,000 a year better pay. The long term Power workers are $14,351 better
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off under their agreem ent than other brew ery w orkers in other parts o f the industry.
Productivity has been extraordinary with output of beer per em ployee twice the European
average. Power has three people on the brewing floor for the same size process for which a
competitor has 27 people on the floor. Other features of the agreem ent are an attractive
employee share scheme in which they get a 10% discount on the market price o f interest free
loans for 5 years and an annual $50,000 scholarship for further education. And Power has
captured 20% of the Queensland beer market in just 3 years.

It can be done and it is being done. There are hundreds of separate similar agreements taking
place all over the country and there are some very important test cases under way at the present
time. The most recent one o f those is Metway Bank in Queensland which has asked the
Industrial Relations Commission to approve its industrial relations agreement with its staff
association. An application that is being heard under Section 115 which deals with one-off
certified agreements.

In comparison to the trend that is there, the Government is still clinging on to the old system.
They are trying to keep the opportunity of national wage cases; they are trying to consolidate
union power into 20 large unions which will not give you collective bargaining, as they
describe it. It is more likely to give you collective mugging as large unions pick off weaker
employers.

But the biggest danger of the present circumstances, I believe, is the Government clinging to
the old system and using words like enterprise bargaining when they aren't putting in place an
effective legislative structure for enterprise bargaining to take place. They risk undoing all the
good that might otherwise be done. They risk, for example, enterprise agreements being given
a less than fair chance. They risk discrediting enterprise bargaining before it has had a real
chance to show what can be done.
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There should be nothing terribly radical, nothing terribly frightening or nothing terribly
alarming about that sort of process. It is after all, as I say, what a lot of workers already want
and they have voted with their feet in that respect. As one woman said to me at Shepparton
Preserving Company, when the shop steward stood up in the meeting and gave her a hard time,
she said: "After all I am only doing what I think is right, it is surely my right to take this
position in order to preserve my job".

I put it to you that you can build an industrial relations system based on genuine consensus.
You can do it by having genuine enterprise agreements at the workplace level. It is possible to
put in place the legislative changes for that to occur and you can do it without coercion. And
those to me are the essential elements of the industrial relations system that is appropriate to the
economic circumstances of Australia in the 1990's.

Thank you.

Dr John Hewson
Canberra, 1991
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